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ABSTRACT

Nowadays, one of the major concerns in information systems security (ISS) management is the employees’ non-compliance
behavior. Several studies have investigated compliance behavior by utilizing several behavioral theories and models.
Deterrence theory is one of the widely used theories in ISS literature in order to investigate compliance behavior. Based on this
theory, behaviors can be controlled by the threat of severe, certain and swift sanctions. This study aims to conduct a quantitative
meta-analysis of existing literature to investigate relationship between constructs of deterrence theory (severity, certainty and
celerity) and compliance behavior of employees. Results show that deterrence theory has not a remarkable impact on
employees’ compliance behavior.
Keywords: Deterrence theory, security compliance, meta-analysis, information systems security, sanctions
INTRODUCTION

Several studies have investigated compliance behavior (e.g. (Bulgurcu et al., 2010) (Herath and Rao, 2009) (Ifinedo, 2012)
(Vance and Siponen, 2012). These studies utilize different behavioral theories and models in order to assess employee’s
intention to comply with IS security policies. Deterrence theory is widely used in IS security literature to explore compliance
behavior (D’Arcy and Herath, 2011). This theory indicates that more severity, certainty and celerity of sanctions for an illicit
action cause more deterrence from engaging in that action (Gibbs, 1975). In information systems security (ISS) literature,
sanction severity, sanction certainty, and sanction celerity are used as constructs in order to investigate employees’ compliance
behavior. However, there are contradictory results for these constructs. Herath and Rao (2009) show that certainty but not
severity has a positive relationship with ISS compliance intention. Siponen and Vance (2007) indicate that none of these
constructs has significant effect on compliance behavior. So the impact of the sanction components on compliance behavior is
not clear.
By considering that several studies have used deterrence theory for investigating compliance behavior and there are
contradictory results in empirical studies, it seems useful to investigate this issue by analyzing the existing research in the ISS
field to assess the impact of deterrence constructs on compliance behavior. In this paper, we use a meta-analysis approach to
synthesize quantitative results of published empirical studies in the ISS field. This gives us a more comprehensive and precise
view of the relationship between deterrence constructs and compliance intention.
RELATED WORK
Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory is grounded in classical criminology (Beccaria, 1963). The theory proposed by Beccaria suggests that people
engage in or avoid criminal action based on tradeoff between subsequent benefits and costs of that action. Deterrence theory
proposes that sanctions deter individuals from engaging in unlawful acts proportionally to the level of sanction severity,
sanction certainty and sanction celerity causes high level of individual deterrence from engaging in that act (Gibbs, 1975).
Sanction celerity is the swiftness of sanctions after violation of certain laws or rules. Sanction severity is the degree of severity
applied in penalties for violation of certain laws or rules. Finally, sanction certainty is defined as the risk of getting caught after
engaging in a prohibited act. Based on deterrence theory, these constructs have positive correlations with an individual’s
deterrence from illicit acts.
Compliance Behavior

The success of ISS policies is closely related to the behavior of employees, because without their compliance, the ISS policies
will not be fruitful. There have been several studies in the information systems (IS) field that investigate employees' compliance
behavior with ISS policies (e.g. Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Herath, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Vance, 2012). These studies help understand
how the intention to comply (or resist) with ISS policies can be assessed in employees. Deterrence theory is broadly used in
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the ISS literature, especially in compliance related studies (D’Arcy and Herath, 2011). Many researchers have integrated
components of deterrence theory (severity, certainty and celerity) with other constructs from various theories (e.g. awareness)
in order to investigate security compliance intention. Deterrence theory has a strong foundation in criminology, and several
empirical studies support this theory in predicting prohibited acts in organizations (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Pratt et al,
2006). However, there are inconsistent results with respect to the impact of deterrence on compliance intention. Some studies
in the IS literature (e.g. Straub, 1990) support the influence of deterrence constructs on compliance behavior, but others (Lee
et al, 2004; Pahnila et al, 2007; Siponen and Vance, 2010) suggest that the deterrence construct has no significant influence on
compliance behavior. In addition there are some studies (e.g. Herath and Rao, 2009) that suggest sanctions certainty, but not
severity, has a positive relationship with the intention to comply with ISS policies. This paper attempts to address this
inconsistency by conducting a meta-analysis of several research papers in the ISS field.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Literature Search

To conduct our meta-analysis, we searched related articles in available academic databases, including Web of Science, ACM
Digital Library, Springer Link, and IEEE. Considering that there are many deterrence related articles in other research fields,
such as criminology and psychology, the first criterion for choosing an article as a candidate article was that it should be in the
ISS field. A second criterion was that candidate article should empirically investigate deterrence constructs with intention to
comply with security policies. Finally, a criterion for selection was that candidate articles should include required quantitative
information, including correlation matrix and constructs reliabilities. After refining our search results according to these criteria,
we ended up with 9 articles (13 studies) for our meta-analysis. Table 1 shows the journal and proceedings names and the
number of selected articles from these sources.
Journal or Proceeding Name

Number of Articles

Decision Support Systems

1

MIS Quarterly

2

Information & management

3

Information Systems Journal

1

Journal of Management Information Systems

1

Proceedings of 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences

1

Table 1. Sources for the Selected Studies
Meta-Analytic Method

After selecting the candidate articles for further analysis we obtained and coded the correlation coefficients (r) and sample sizes
(N) for all studies. Considering that most of the studies reported correlation coefficients and it is simpler to interpret r in terms
of practical importance (Glass, McGaw, and Smith, 1981), we chose Pearson's correlation coefficient as primary estimator of
effect size. By using reliabilities of constructs we corrected each of correlations, since measurement errors can weaken and
reduce the correlation coefficients (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990; Schepers andWetzels, 2007).
We used Fisher Z transformation to calculate each r’s corresponding Zri for direct effect size analysis. The weighted mean Zr
or effect size (ES) is computed based on sample sizes, and are provided in table 2. By using standard errors of the weighted
mean ES, the 95% confidence intervals for each ES are calculated. After obtaining confidence intervals, inverse Zr
transformation is used to transforming back the correlations (r) of each pairwise relationship. The meta-analysis formulas that
we have used in this study are provided in appendix A.
DATA ANALYSIS
Descriptive Results

For each relationship, table 2 shows total number of studies, range of correlations, number of significant and non-significant
relationships found, and cumulative sample size. Results show that sanction severity is used more than other constructs in
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compliance studies. Studies that used sanction celerity are rare, because there are difficulties in sanction celerity measurement
(D’Arcy and Herath, 2011).
Pairwise
Relationship

Number of
Studies

Range of
Correlations

Cumulative
Sample Size

Correlations

lower

upper

# significant

# non-significant

% significant

SSEV-IC

13

0.22

0.45

7

6

53.84

7045

SCER-IC

10

0.24

0.33

7

3

70.00

4765

SCEL-IC

2

0.14

0.15

1

1

50.00

799

Table 2. Descriptive Results (SSEV: perceived sanction severity; SCER: perceived sanction certainty; SCEL: perceived sanction
celerity; IC: intention to comply with IS security policies.)
Direct Effect Size Results

Table 3 provides weighted mean effect size (ES) values that are calculated based on Fisher’s Z-transformed sample size. ES is
valuable for investigating the strength of relationships because larger sample size correlations provide a mean correlation that
is closer to the population mean (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). The data in Table 3 shows that ES for the relationship between
sanction certainty and compliance intention is the largest among all relationships. This implies that sanction certainty is a
stronger predictor of compliance intention than either severity or celerity. However, all three relationships have small effect
sizes and thus only small impact on compliance intention when looking at the cumulative sample.
Pairwise
Relationship
SSEV-IC

Weighted
Mean ES

Standard Error of the
Mean ES SEES (z-test)

95% Confidence Interval
lower limit

upper limit

0.15

0.0001(1500)

0.149

0.150

SCER-IC

0.21

0.0002(1050)

0.209

0.210

SCEL-IC

0.13

0.0012(108.33)

0.127

0.132

Table 3. Meta-Analysis Results For Relationships Between Deterrence Constructs and Compliance Intention
By using inverse of Zr transformation we calculated correlation (r) indexes for all weighted average effect sizes (ES). According
to Cohen (1988), effect sizes of r=0.1, r=0.3 and r=0.5 are indicators of small, medium and large effect sizes respectively. As
we can see in table 4, none of the relationships has medium or large effect size. These results confirm that sanction certainty is
a stronger predictor for compliance behavior. The effect size of celerity is smallest and it has a weak relationship with
compliance intention. Considering that there are contradictory results for relationships between deterrence constructs and
compliance intention, results show that all relationships have significant but small effect sizes.
Statistics
Sanction celerity (1)
Sanction severity (2)
Sanction certainty (3)
Intention to comply (4)

1
1
*
*
0.11

2

3

4

1
*
0.14

1
0.19

1

Table 4. Correlation Matrix for Deterrence Constructs and Compliance Intention (* Relationship is not reported in selected
studies)
DISCUSSION

This study utilizes meta-analysis in order to explore the relationships between deterrence theory constructs and intention to
comply with ISS policies. Descriptive results show contradictory findings in literature. These results also show that severity is
studied more than other constructs to investigating compliance behavior. On the other hand, studies that have used sanction
celerity are rare because of measurement difficulties and lack of theoretical importance. According to Paternoster (2010),
formal punishments generally have low certainty. Formal punishments also have low celerity because they are usually applied
long after crime commitment. Therefore, certainty and celerity of sanctions are usually low and there is not remarkable variation
in individuals’ perception of celerity and certainty. This could be an important reason for neglecting certainty and celerity in

Proceedings of the Southern Association for Information Systems Conference, St. Augustine, FL, USA March 18th–19th, 2016

3

Abed and Weistroffer

Meta-Analysis of Deterrence Theory

several studies. However, the meta-analysis results show that certainty has more influence on compliance intention than
severity. So the low certainty does not necessarily mean that this construct should be neglected. In addition, celerity depends
on violation type and individual’s perception of swiftness. For example for one individual, punishments and sanctions need to
occur within one day to be considered swift, for other individuals one week or even one month may still be considered swift.
Furthermore, the swiftness perception of individuals is different for a minor policy violation than for a major policy violation.
This makes the measurement of celerity difficult.
CONCLUSION

Results show that for better understanding of the impact of deterrence constructs on compliance intention, more studies are
needed. Future research may discuss possible ways for measuring sanction celerity. In addition, few studies have used sanction
components as control variables.
Based on the cumulative sample and all statistical results in the selected studies (e.g. direct effect size analysis) we found that
deterrence constructs are not strong predictors of compliance behavior. All relationships between deterrence constructs and
compliance intention are weak. However, all of the sanction components do affect compliance intention. Therefore future
research should not neglect any of deterrence constructs in studying compliance behavior. However, these constructs perhaps
should be considered alongside other constructs from other theories or models (e.g. awareness) for exploring compliance
behavior. The tendency to use severity more than other sanction components lacks an important fact that certainty could be a
stronger predictor of compliance behavior than severity. Managers also might consider that deterrence and punishment by
themselves are not strong predictors or control factors for employees' compliance behavior. Sanctions and punishments may
need to be combined with other factors, such as awareness, in order to predict or control compliance behavior. Moreover, if
managers want sanctions to be more effective in compliance behavior of employees, they should focus on certainty of sanctions,
as certainty is stronger predictor of compliance behavior than other sanctions components.
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Appendix A. Formulas Used in this Study

Statistics

Description

Formula

r

Corrected r (Wu & Lederer, 2009)

Rcorrected=runcorrected/(√reliabilityx √reliabilityy)

Zi

Fisher’s r to Z transformation

Zi=(1/2) loge[1+r/1-r]

ES

Weighted mean ES (Rosenthal, 1984)

ES=∑((Ni -3)Zi /(Ni -3))

SEES

Standard error of the mean ES (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001)

√(1/∑(Ni-3))

Z-test

z-test (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001)

z-test=ES/SEES

CI

Confidence interval (Lipsey and Wilson,2001)

CI=ES±1.96(SEES)

R

Inverse of the Z transformed correlation(Lipsey &Wilson, 2001)

R=(e2ES-1)/(e2ES+1)
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